THEOLOGY

VOL. LXIV SEPTEMBER, 1961 No. 495

Liberty and Authority in the Church

I USE the word "authority" here to mean title to be believed or obeyed, as distinguished from "power", which means ability to compel obedience. Often authority and power are combined in the same person, e.g. a father or schoolmaster is morally entitled to be obeyed by his children or pupils and also has the power to compel obedience.

Human beings are manifestly at the outset of their lives entirely dependent on authority for learning what to believe and do, and they remain so to a large extent, for it is impossible for an individual to verify for himself all the beliefs on the basis of which he has to act. None of us can become "an authority" on all subjects. We are bound in many matters to depend on the authority of those persons or institutions that are entitled to be believed, e.g. the experts on particular subjects. It is reasonable for a mature man thus to be guided by authority in matters which he cannot verify for himself, because he presumes that if he had the time, opportunity and requisite expertise he could verify for himself what he thus accepts on authority.

"Authorities" are trustworthy not only according to their expertness but also in proportion as they are free and determined to reckon honestly with new discoveries that bear on their subject. Thus, the trustworthiness of a close corporation, which suppressed evidence that conflicted with received opinions or did not allow its members to put forward new opinions, would be more or less gravely impaired. The only agreement worth having is that of those who possess the right to differ.

All human knowledge is limited, and all human authorities are contingent; they are relative to the time and place in which they exist, to the amount of knowledge that is available to them, to their capacity for understanding what can be known, and to the capacity of language itself for expressing various kinds of truth.

The only unconditional authority is God himself. He alone has an absolute title to be believed and obeyed. It is the Christian faith that, in addition to all that can be perceived of God's "invisible nature . . . in the things that have been made" (Rom. 1. 20), God has made himself known through the prophetic testimony of the Old Testament and the apostolic testimony of the New Testament. Both these testimonies have their centre in "the Word made flesh". It was "the Word *of God*" that was made flesh, and therefore he is the bearer of absolute authority, but "the Word was made *flesh*", which is to say that he became incarnate in human existence with all its intrinsic contingencies of thought and language, and therefore there is an element of contingency even in the *ipsissima verba*

of Christ himself in so far as they can be accurately recovered. Similarly, with regard to the historical facts on which Christian doctrine depends and which it interprets, while there must be a sufficiency of evidence for the facts to which appeal is made, it must also be recognized that they do not admit of demonstrative proof but that here as in all historical investigation "probability is the very guide of life". Thus, for example, while we may not assert that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ is as cogent as that for the death of Julius Caesar, it must needs be adequate for the support of the doctrine dependent on it; and the same is true of all other dogmas to be believed for salvation.

If these considerations apply to the incarnate Lord himself and to the credenda concerning him, *a fortiori* they will apply to the authority of the Church.

The Ecclesia, which was constituted or reconstituted by the advent of the Word and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, has a divine commission to communicate and to commend the prophetic and apostolic testimony to all nations and has a divine promise that in doing so it will be led into all truth. This commission and this promise are given to the whole apostolic Church. At the same time, in the New Testament a special authority is assigned to the apostles for witnessing to the Gospel and governing the Church, and in a special manner they are promised the guidance of the Holy Spirit who is the vicar of Christ. They properly take the lead in proclaiming the Gospel and in building the Church. But teaching and governing authority is not exclusively concentrated in the apostles. All the members of the Church share in the gifts of the Spirit who "apportions to each one individually as he wills" (1 Cor. 12. 11). Thus alongside the apostles authority was from the first exercised by other members of the Church—evangelists, teachers, prophets, presbyters, etc.: no hard and fast line was drawn between an *ecclesia docens* and an *ecclesia discens*.

There is no clear prescription in the New Testament about how the authority entrusted to the Church was to be exercised after the apostolic age. Attempts to show that, e.g., a presbyterian or a papal polity is there prescribed for the whole church for ever seem forced and unconvincing. But it is evident that an authority corresponding to that of the apostles has been exercised in the Church throughout its history, although the organs and structures through which it has been exercised have varied in different times and places. When light dawns after the tunnel period in the 2nd century, bishops are found to be exercising an apostolic authority in preserving the integrity of the Church's witness to the Gospel and they have continued to do so ever since, despite the variations in the form of the episcopal office. Bishops have exercised apostolic authority not only in their dioceses but through their assembling in local and general councils or synods.

But, in accordance with the analogy of the New Testament, authority has been exercised in the Church by other ordained ministers and by laymen too. Not least was this so in the early cen-

turies, e.g. Justin Martyr, Origen, before his ordination as well as when he was a presbyter, etc. Laymen, as well as the inferior clergy, have participated in the work of witnessing to the Gospel that was given once for all, and in interpreting and applying it in relation to changing conditions and advancing knowledge, and they ought to do so. For hierarchies can err and have erred, even in their most august representatives. The whole body of the faithful, who share in the gifts of the Spirit, contribute to the authority of the Church by testing and checking and verifying what at first they receive on trust and whatever subsequent directives may be given by the hierarchy. In the long run the authority of the Holy Spirit in the Church is mediated and becomes effective through the interaction of the various elements in its constitution. No single element is entitled to override the others by an *ipse dixit* or a *causa finita est*. That is to say, what is authoritative is in the long run to be ascertained from the *consensus fidelium*, which includes the testimony of the laity, as Newman emphasized in a famous passage in *The Rambler*, "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine" (with reference to the christological controversies of the 4th century).

Another way of expressing the wholesome complexity of the operation of authority in the Church, and of avoiding the temptation to simplify it, is to observe that Scripture, tradition and reason each has its part to play and that none is entirely sufficient without the others. In *Scripture* there is a crystallization of the prophetic and apostolic testimony to which the Church confesses itself to be permanently bound and subject. *Tradition*, which is conspicuously expressed in liturgy and the sacramental life of the Church, represents the continuous and developing experience of the Church as it brings out of its treasure things new as well as old. *Reason* stands for the duty of all Christians, according to their abilities, to exercise their minds upon the data of Scripture and tradition and to reckon honestly with the discovery of new facts and with new ways of thinking, and thereby to contribute to the development and maybe to the reformulation of Christian doctrine. Authority embraces all these elements and it is through the interaction of them all that the Holy Spirit is guiding the Church into all truth. The Church is responsible for seeing that all its members have the maximum opportunity of playing their appropriate parts in this process, e.g. by education and by giving the laity as well as the clergy a place in its councils.

On this view of authority, there is always sufficient light available to enable men to be sure what they ought to believe and practice. At any given time the Church, using the resources of Scripture, tradition and reason, through the ministry of the hierarchy, of pastors, evangelists and theologians, and through the witness of the faithful, has *adequate* authority to bring home to mankind the Gospel of God and to build up those who respond to it in the Christian way of common life and obedience. But to claim *absolute* authority for itself or for any element or organ within its constitution is to make itself into an idol and to usurp the prerogative of the Holy Spirit. By refusing to claim absolute authority for itself,

the Church witnesses to the continuing activity of the Holy Spirit who is ever guiding it into a fuller understanding of that truth which will be known completely or absolutely only "at the last day". No definitions made by the Church *in via* are in themselves final or irreformable, however faithfully they serve to mediate to mankind the final authority of God for practical purposes. "The secret things belong to the Lord our God; but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law" (Deut. 29. 29). It is always the case that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us" (2 Cor. 4. 7). Articulated credenda may always be susceptible of improved expression in the light of theological reflection and may require revision in the light of new discoveries. So "we walk by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5. 7). The craving for an absolute authority on the human plane is a craving to escape from this condition.

In order that the Church's teaching shall always be open to the further guidance of the Holy Spirit and shall not become fossilized or impermeable by new discoveries, it is requisite that the greatest possible amount of liberty of speculation and play of mind be allowed to the members of the Church, not least to theologians. Otherwise the Church's authority becomes like that of the scribes. The greater the Church's trust in the absolute authority of God and in the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit, the greater will be its readiness to see its received doctrines and ordinances under constant re-examination. The Church has of course power to suppress or to exclude those of its members who advance heretical opinions and may have on occasion to use it, but in view of the paramount importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of thought and experiment, and in view of the inveterate tendency of ecclesiastical as of other institutions to a blind conservatism, the Church should use this power with the utmost restraint. While there is a proper pastoral care in the Church to avoid scandalizing simple believers, there should be an equal care to avoid scandalizing the erudite and the educated.

A. R. Vidler.

The Cup of Cold Water and the Cup of Blessing[1]

Dr Michael Wilson, in his recent contributions to Theology,[2] presented a theology of a ministry of healing which was, in part at least, based upon a sacramental view of everyday life. Work in hospitals, clinics and homes is to be claimed as the work of Christ. He is continuing his work, decisively begun in his healing ministry, of making God the King of all the world and the medical world in particular. This is a most welcome approach, and almost certainly,

[1] Adapted from a paper read to the Society for the Study of Theology.
[2] Theology, May and June 1960.

at this time, the right one. It will challenge, and assist, those who can see nothing religious in their daily work with seemingly merely material matters like penicillin, drains and blood counts. However, new problems arise, for there is another equally large group of Christian and non-Christian humanists who already see their personal service as a sacramental life which renders sacraments and all other specifically "religious" activities redundant. The extension of medicine into the healing of the whole person has encouraged them, and they seem, if we are to judge by the enthusiasm with which some pastors seem to divest themselves of clerical techniques to start the really priestly business of case-work, to have made many converts. It is not surprising; for non-Christian humanists, both the "nice" agnostics and the "nasty" militant atheists, are doing mighty works, releasing men and women from the bondage of what only yesterday was called sin. It seems that the Lord the Spirit intends through them to teach us a lesson, healing men and women where he listeth. Bursting wide open our doctrines of Priesthood and Sacraments he declares the Real Presence of Christ in secular acts of mercy and healing. He demands that we take in the strongest sense Dr Wilson's statement, based upon our Lord's words, that "even a cup of cold water could be the means of spiritual blessing". The theological question is whether we can accept acts of mercy and healing as true sacraments within a sacramental theology which, whilst preserving the distinction between Christ's sacraments and a general sacramental attitude to life, does not confine those sacraments to either the two or seven.

In an attempt to answer this question it is suggested here that acts of mercy, the giving of "a cup of cold water only", are effective signs of a union of Christ with men and women within his Whole Body, and thus the dispositive cause of the participant's salvation. In this sacrament, in traditional terms, the sacrament alone (*sacramentum tantum*) is the outward, visible merciful act, the reality and the sacrament (*res et tantum*) is Christ in his Whole Body doing the act, and the reality alone (*res tantum*) is the actual union effected by Christ with the participants of the act; the grace of which union can be appropriated by the participants.

The term "the Whole Body" defines the society through which, and within which, Christ unites himself with men and women. The term is chosen because one is needed which will, like the terms "the Mystical Body" and "the Whole Christ", suggest the marvellous and incomprehensible organic unity of Christ with mankind, but which has not traditionally become identified with the Church. With this in mind we modify the definition of a sacrament suggested by Prof. Leeming[1] to read as follows: "An effective sign of a particular form of union with the Whole Body, instituted by Christ, which gives grace to those who receive it rightly." The Whole Body sets the sacraments within social limits which are wider than the Church but not exclusive of the Church.

[1] *Principles of Sacramental Theology*, Introduction, p. vi.

There is in the Bible a continuous thread of belief that God, whilst never absent from human history, giving it a general sacramental nature, is particularly present in effective saving union with his people in times of physical suffering and deprivation. He is really present in saving power in battle, flood, thirst, sickness and hunger. This reaches its conclusion in the effective signs of healing wrought by Christ: "If I by the finger of God cast out devils then the Kingdom of God is come amongst you." This belief in the real presence of God at such times is confirmed by Christ in the "Ye did it unto" passage of Matthew 25 and the "He that receiveth you receiveth me" passages of Mark 9 andMatthew 10. It is in these same passages, with their strong emphasis upon the organic union of Christ with men in the suffering-mercy situation, that we find the phrase "a cup of cold water". This phrase may thus serve to represent the sacrament of mercy as we discuss its relations with the accepted sacraments and especially the Eucharistic "cup of blessing". Both cups announce and bring about the Real Presence of Christ. Thus an Anglican, Dr Alan Richardson, writing on the corporate Son of Man, and of the identification of Christ with every single man,[1] can use words traditionally associated with the Real Presence in the two elements and say, "This is the heart of the Christian agape: 'ye did it unto me.' . . . The poor sufferer whom I help . . . shews me Christ, makes Christ real to me, enables me to touch, serve and tend Christ."

The sacrament of mercy was instituted by Christ in his healing work, in his pronouncement "ye did it unto me", and in his statement that the man who receives those who especially represent him, his apostles of children and sick and deprived men and women, receive him. He takes bread and blesses it in the midst of his disciples, and gives it to them that they may receive himself. He takes a child in the midst of his disciples and gives it to them that they may receive himself. Thus Christ offers himself, his Real Presence, by two sacraments he has instituted. The symbolism of the taking of the little child, the healing miracles, the cup of cold water, and the cup of wine at the Last Supper, must each and all be taken in the strong sense. They do not merely describe a quality of God or of the saved state, but they are the very effecting of the Real Presence of God in power to save. Like all the Gospel effective signs, and like all the sacraments, they are crisis situations, and those who misuse or deny them have judged themselves already. As some modern psychiatric opinions confirm, to be in the Real Presence of Love and to refuse it (e.g. the breast and the mother) is to move towards self-destruction.[2]

The difficulties which arise from claiming the status of a sacrament for merciful acts are only too obvious. Unhappily, sacramental theology has been hammered out over the centuries in disputes where the Church was often both petitioner and judge. The resulting case law, reflecting an anxious concern to define the Church's

[1] *Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament*, p. 137.
[2] E.g. Melanie Klein and cp. St Augustine's *Confession*, Bk 1, on his infancy.

authority and membership, has produced a sacramental theology which is similarly preoccupied. It has largely excluded the lay celebrant and always found identical boundaries for the sphere of each and every sacrament. The consequence is that, to the greatest part of Christendom, it seems obvious that the sacraments of Christ are something done by a ministry set aside for that purpose, performed to a set ritual, and usually conducted within a church building. For this reason, to suggest that when Mr X gives Mr Y a cup of cold water in an act of mercy, there is a celebration comparable to the cup of blessing, is to invite the accusation of taking a "low view" of Holy Orders and Sacraments.

In the ethos of the Reformation such an accusation might very well have been justified. For then, as Prof. Manson pointed out, enthusiasm for the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers was too often motivated by enthusiasm for "the priesthood of no believers whatsoever". Similarly those, like Quakers, who proclaimed Christ's Real Presence in works of mercy, often suggested that this made his Real Presence in formal sacraments redundant. In this article these false "either-ors" are rejected as false. The priesthood of all believers, itself part of a wider priesthood of all men within Christ's Whole Body, is claimed to contain within it many ministries set in the church, of which one is the ministry of the sacrament of mercy. This ministry does not detract from the ministry of the cup of blessing, for all the ministries are different functions of the one Whole Body. In this light the fulness of Christ, the perfecting of his Whole Body, waits upon the fulness of the theology of the priesthood of all believers and of the sacrament of mercy.

It may be objected that a sacrament requires not only deeds and materials but words pronouncing what is being done, as for example in Baptism both water and the Trinitarian formula. Whilst there are Dominical words to hand, such as "receiveth me" or "the Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you", the formal pronouncement of such at the time of giving a cup of cold water or an injection of penicillin is clearly impracticable. However, in answer to this objection it may be observed that Christ himself, in the merciful acts and healing works with which he instituted the sacrament of mercy, did not invariably interpret them at the same moment. Certainly he both acts and proclaims the nature of the effective signs in which the witnesses have participated, but the word and deed, essential though they both are, do not follow in strict alternation. Nor is one superior to the other. So, too, when Christ in his Whole Body fulfills his command "Heal the sick and say unto them the Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you", the two aspects of deed and word may be fulfilled in healing by an atheist and verbal witness by a Christian at another time and place. The two men coinhere within a sacrament of mercy within Christ's Whole Body, and they and the sufferer and the witnesses *all* may receive grace. There is a most important point here. It is not a question of the Church's claiming medicine

[1] T. W. Manson, *Ministry and Priesthood. Christ's and Ours*, p. 40.

for Christ-in-itself, bringing it under its wing and judging it or blessing it. Rather it is that all concerned, within and without the Church, are judged and blessed when they say "amen" to the sacrament of mercy which is done in their midst. This is likely to be as shocking for the Church as it is for the world.

The result of taking seriously the sacrament of mercy is a fresh examination of, and fresh insight into, the relation between the society of Christ's Body, the Church, and Christ's Whole Body, the world. Sacraments will be seen as unions effected by Christ within his Whole Body for his Whole Body. The Church as a member of the Whole Body is thus redeemed by sacramental unions effected by Christ with the world. In this light a sacrament, like the cup of blessing, is not seen as an occasion when Christ feeds the Church, but as an occasion when Christ feeds the world. The sacraments were instituted by Christ that the world—not only, or primarily, the Church—through him might be saved. The cup of cold water teaches us this, not only because acts of mercy, healing and deliverance from sin are visibly being done outside the Church, but also by the circumstances of Christ's institution of this sacrament.

The passages in which Christ speaks of his Real Presence in merciful acts are marked by a tendency to suggest unconditional validity. In Matthew 25, in the "ye did it unto me" passage, there is no requirement that the merciful act should have been done by or to his disciples, or even in his name. In Mark 10 and Matthew 9, where those who give a cup of water receive their reward, and those who receive a little one receive Christ, whilst the actions are stated to be done "in my name", it seems unlikely that all who do so are accredited followers of Christ, and certain that they are not his disciples or apostles. It may be significant that it is following Jesus' words, "*Whosoever* shall receive one of such children in my name" that St John puts the test case of the unauthorized man "casting out devils in thy name". Jesus seems to rebuke the excessive conditionalism of St John, not only by his words "forbid him not", but by reiterating his "whosoever". He says, "For whosoever shall give you a cup of cold water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you he shall no wise lose his reward". Jesus seems to answer John by reference to his Whole Body and the sacrament of mercy. The "ye did it unto me" passages show how men and women may meet the real Christ in the sick and deprived as in the bread and the wine, and receive him worthily unto salvation or unworthily unto damnation. Christ effects such meetings, such particular forms of union with himself, which bring grace to those who receive such meetings rightly, not only within his Church but within his Whole Body. The Church is marked by being called to suffer and be redeemed in such unions of Christ with the world.

It may be objected that there is nothing new here. It may be said that it is universally recognized by Christians that the Church must go out from its services and communions to involve itself in the world. But what is suggested here is that there is a much wider extension in space and time of the Real Presence than we usually

visualize. So, for example, the Eucharist is not just given to the Church, so that the Church may be strengthened by it to do good works and benefit the world. Rather the world, in the Whole Body, receives in the merciful act of Christians the body and blood, and experiences a union with Christ. There is vividly demonstrated in the sacrament of mercy an extension in time and place of the union of Christ with man which is perhaps more easily seen in Baptism than Holy Communion. For Baptism gives an abiding character which makes grace available at diverse times and diverse places. This relation between "character" and "grace", for which the Fathers strained to find a suitable illustration, is illuminated by the organic models of contemporary psychological theory.[1] In them, every meeting between men, like every sacrament, is an historic event which becomes, through the transference mechanism, a part of the subsequent meetings of these two men with any other man. This interactionist theory means that every union (including the response of free man involved in the union) not only imposes an indelible character on the immediate participants, but imposes indelible character on all the subsequent unions with other men of the two participants. Perhaps, if the Augustinian distinction between grace and character is to be retained, it may be best illuminated by personal human models of thought of this kind. We may then see the permanent character imposed as the ineradicable experience of the Real Presence of Christ, a face to face meeting effected by the Holy Spirit in the sacrament of mercy, the Eucharist, or other sacrament; which together with the personal response completes an event which leaves the person and, through him, the Whole Body permanently changed. Thus the work done extends indefinitely, and every man meets Christ to blessing and judgment.

We may conclude by asking what we may learn from this approach to acts of mercy and healing, which we may apply to the relations between medicine and the Church. Perhaps, first of all, that the sickness-healing situation is intended to be a crisis situation. It is God's will that Christ, through those present at the sickness-healing situation, should remember what he did once and for all in Palestine. This is what preaching allied to acts of mercy and healing produce. When a doctor or a nurse goes to visit a sick man they go to meet their Lord. The Whole Body of Christ goes to meet Christ, to see and receive its own mystery on the sick bed, as St Augustine says of the Body in the bread on the table.[2] The preaching of the Church demands of all in the sickness-healing situation that they say "Amen" to "this is my body" and so become what they are, the Whole Body of Christ. The preaching of the Church to the medical world gives meaning to the medical world not only in the general sense of giving a meaning to life as a whole—though this is important—but by making every particular sickness-healing situation a salvation crisis. Every single work of healing is declared providential. The natural

[1] E.g. S. H. Foulkes, *Group Psychotherapy*, p. 136.
[2] *Sermo* 272.

laws which appear to encapsulate the clinical event under the flag of fate are declared under the lordship of God, revealing his providence and seeking man's response. The patient, relatives and medical services who constitute the "clinical event", not excluding the love and compassion included in that event, are required to be what they are, salvation events, "that the works of God should be made manifest (in him)". The sacrament of mercy done by all sorts and conditions of men in the medical services is made manifest by the word and work of the Church, by its own healing and preaching.

The second result of seeing the sacrament of mercy as a work of Christ within his Whole Body is to avoid, or at any rate reduce, the possibility of medico-pastoral co-operation being one of mutual acceptance and congratulation on the basis of marginal and well-defined co-operation. The Church in such marginal co-operation blesses Medicine and Medicine in return finds a place for the pastor amongst its ancillary staff. The result of recognition of the sacrament of mercy is, on the contrary, to reveal the possibility of men and women responding to sickness in themselves and others in a way which puts both Church and Medicine to shame. The sacrament of Mercy within the Whole Body having been torn apart and secularized and institutionalized within the Church and Medicine of our culture, it is not to be supposed that it can be reconstituted by an easy co-operation of the two parts without judgment being felt by those institutions and the culture they embody. Both Church and Medicine, confronted with the Real Presence of Christ in the sacrament of mercy, are likely to say, "Lord, when saw we thee . . . sick?"

A third result of the sacrament of mercy is to emphasize that the sickness situation, whilst intensely private, is yet a public opportunity. The healing works of Christ are opportunities of salvation not only for the sick man but also for the witnesses. Thus the local church and the sick in the houses of the street of the parish, with all peoples of that parish, constitute a salvation situation. The fellowship of the local church becomes the fellowship of the Body of Christ as and when it goes to meet its Head under the form of the sick and suffering in the houses and the streets of the parish. The sickness situation is there, not that the Church may satisfy itself or others of its piety, nor yet to earn or expend grace received in its ritual sacraments, but that the works of God may be made manifest in it, and that work the salvation of the world through his Son Jesus Christ. Failure to respond to the sickness situation by acts of mercy and love is to be judged already. Failure to recognize the acts of mercy and love as works of God is also to be judged already, whether it take the form of rejection by the sufferer of offered acts of love or a cynical interpretation of such acts by observers, as witnesses said of Jesus' palpably good works that they were the work of Beelzebub—in modern terms "motivated by self-interest" or "only sublimated self-centred libido". This social aspect of the healing work of Christ in his earthly ministry, which lays reasonable emphasis upon the fact that it was experienced as a spiritual crisis by

the observers, may be obvious enough. Yet, because of a marked tendency amongst those interested in the healing work of the Church to portray it solely as an appeal to the sick individual to cast himself in faith on the mercy of God, the social aspect of the crisis needs emphasis to-day. This emphasis may be encouraged by the affirmation of the sacrament of mercy at this time, when the corporate aspects of Baptism and Eucharist are being understood and welcomed.

R. A. Lambourne.

Revised Reviews: IX—Gore's The Reconstruction of Belief

The Reconstruction of Belief is a trilogy: *Belief in God* appeared in 1921, *Belief in Christ* in 1922, *The Holy Spirit and the Church* in 1924. The three were published in one volume as *The Reconstruction of Belief* in 1926.

In the preface to the first volume, Gore stated that his intention was to produce "an ordered and reasoned statement of my faith as a Christian", and that he was endeavouring to appeal to the ordinary educated reader. In the preface to the third volume, he stresses this appeal to intellectual inquiry. "However we come to believe," he says, "the test of the rationality of our faith lies in its submission to the light of reason and history. It is, as I contend at length in this volume, a false view of authority which represents it as precluding free inquiry. It is our intellectual duty and responsibility to think freely." Thus his overriding aim is to state and defend the arguments of reason and of history for the Christian Faith, conducting his discussion in the spirit of free and unfettered inquiry, accepting whatever conclusions the facts and rational reflection upon them may demand.

The Reconstruction of Belief runs to some 980 pages, and as it was reprinted in 1930, this says much both for the readability of the book and for the demand for such a work from the ordinary educated readers of the twenties, in contrast to our own day when bishops complain that they are too busy to have time to read, and teachers complain they cannot afford to buy books.

The volume covers an immense field, dealing with such important topics as the nature of God, the reliability of the historical evidence for Christian Belief, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Holy Spirit in the Church, the authority of the Church and the authority of Scripture. In a short reassessment it is hardly profitable to attempt to summarize his discussion, conducted fully, at a leisurely, unhurried pace, of all these subjects. Rather the wisest course will be to show how Gore handles one or two important topics; this may illustrate the tone and quality of his arguments, and perhaps reveal whatever defects they seem to possess when reassessed some half-century later.

The first problem Gore tackles is that of belief in God. At the

outset of the discusion, he declares that "the most pressing question is not whether we can believe in God but of what sort the God is in whom we can or must believe. Atheism is very rare and agnosticism is a question of degree. . . . The important question is: how much can we know or rationally believe about God?" (p. 45). Appealing to the testimony of philosophers throughout the ages, he argues that the dominant philosophical tradition has asserted *that* God exists. He illustrates this contention by reference to a number of arguments which, in principle, are teleological in nature, although he does not himself so label them. He does not refer to the ontological or the cosmological arguments. He makes great play of the moral argument—the argument from the existence of truth, beauty, goodness as moral absolutes which must represent the essential qualities of the ground and source of all Being. From the Christian point of view, philosophical arguments, although clearly useful and valuable up to a point, are inadequate, since, argues Gore, philosophers have stopped short of declaring clearly and categorically that God is a personal God. To show that God is a personal God we must rely on the evidence of revelation. Gore's method here is to outline the teaching of the Hebrew prophets about God as supremely the God who discloses himself and enters into relationships with his creatures; to show how this series of revelations culminated in the supreme revelation given in the life and ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus; to argue for its uniqueness as something which is neither the product of philosophical speculation, nor any form of elaborate inference derived from human experience, nor indebted historically to any foreign sources, nor, finally, is it to be explained in terms of some esoteric psychological theory. This discussion of revelation ends, we must notice, on the following note: "But of the source of the communications (to the Hebrew prophets) as coming really and directly from God, *I dare to feel certain*" (p. 107, my italics).

What are we to make of all this to-day? Leaving aside the question how far his thesis accurately or otherwise reflects the philosophical speculations of the early part of this century, and leaving aside any criticism of his understanding of the main stream of philosophical tradition, I think that there are two main observations to make. First, Gore's conclusion to the discussion on the evidence of revelation is simply an assertion of his own personal conviction. It is not the conclusion to an argument, the result of a process of thought and free inquiry. Indeed, at no point in this particular discussion does he betray any awareness of the philosophical difficulties which beset the notion of revelation. Secondly, living in the second half of the century, we cannot fail to be a little bemused by Gore's concern that the real problem for Christian belief is not one about the existence of God, but about his nature. Agnosticism and atheism *are* widespread to-day. Moreover, the philosophical revolution which was just getting under way when Gore's work was being published, has suggested that the very terms in which Gore formulates the problem may be themselves meaningless, so that in fact no serious or profitable discussion is possible, one way or another. Contemporary

theologians have, in general, adopted a hostile and negative attitude towards modern linguistic philosophy, and only recently a regius professor triumphantly hailed signs of its impending eclipse. Theologians have been saying this for so long that one suspects the wish is father of the thought. Clearly, if Christian Apologetic is to cut any ice to-day, it will have to reckon, soberly and rationally, with the philosophical difficulties of the meaning of the term "God" before it can embark on a discussion of his existence. To do this it will ignore the insights of linguistic philosophy only at its peril. Meanwhile, for this particular task, Gore, alas, will remain rather a naive, unsatisfactory guide.

One of the shocks which "the traditional framework of belief" suffered, according to Gore, was delivered by the application of the techniques and methods of historical science to the Bible. Any attempt at vindicating the rationality of Christian Belief must turn from speculative arguments about God to a detailed examination of the concrete historical evidence upon which the main claims of Christian belief are based. Gore is perceptive enough to declare candidly that it would be foolish "to entertain for a moment the idea of excepting the sacred documents of Christianity from the severest and freest criticism. Reason essentially demands that historical criticism shall apply itself with equal and full freedom to every document" (p. 176). And he has some wise observations to offer about historical method: "No doubt all historical criticism implies, more or less, intellectual presuppositions,—it must come to its examination of documents with certain canons of probability. But these canons of probability must be very carefully examined and themselves criticized. All good historical criticism must be very submissive to the real evidence in each particular case . . ." (p. 177).

Proceeding from this point to examine the credentials of the New Testament documents, he relies very much on the accepted results of the New Testament historical criticism current in his day. He accepts the Papias tradition of the Petrine reminiscences underlying St Mark's gospel, and he concludes that John Mark was "admirably qualified to give us an exact account of the story of the apostles about their experiences with our Lord", and that his "gospel has every claim to count for good history" (p. 193). As for the author of the Third Gospel, "we have the best reason to claim for him that he is a careful and well-informed historian in direct access 'to those who from the first were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word'—which is the claim of his preface" (p. 200). "We shall do well", he continues, "to saturate our minds in these two documents (St Mark and St Luke). We shall find ourselves on the most solid historical ground." With this degree of confidence in the historical authenticity of the Gospels, the problem of reconstructing the portrait of the life and ministry of Jesus offers no great difficulty, especially if we rely on the evidence of the Gospels. If, however, we approach the evidence with some *a priori* view about miracles being contrary to nature, then we are bound to run into difficulties of affirming belief in a supernatural religion on the basis of *historical* evidence. This, says Gore, is the

line followed by the left-wing group of critics, including Sanday, Inge, Kirsopp Lake, Rashdall, Glover, and others. It leads, especially in Sanday's case, to affirming the Incarnation whilst denying, "or at least seriously doubting, the real occurrence of miracles" (p. 222). This line of apologetic is wholly anathema to Gore. For him, belief in the Incarnation is inextricably connected with belief in the power of Jesus to perform miracles. Deny the latter, and the grounds for belief in the Incarnation disappear. How is this dilemma between the claims of historical science and of the Gospels to be resolved? First, in Gore's view, we must examine the presupposition mainly responsible for it, namely that miracles are contrary to nature. His analysis of this presupposition is acute and forceful. No predetermined *a priori* view must be allowed to limit or cramp the scope of historical criticism of the New Testament evidence. Moreover, if we believe in God as the all-powerful Creator, nothing can limit the theoretical possibility "of the manifestation of His power in the physical world in order to fulfil His purpose". And finally, maintains Gore, "there is no ground for the assumption that the physical world which science investigates . . . is a self-complete and closed world" (p. 251). Having thus demolished the views of the left-wing critics, he proceeds to examine the New Testament evidence of the miraculous, and, in detail, the evidence for the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Virgin Birth. Any fair and rational review of the evidence, he maintains, must compel the conclusion that these events happened, and that the New Testament accounts of their occurrence are historically authentic.

Reviewing this discussion to-day, we would be bound to recognize that the conclusions of Form Criticism, stressing the part played by the pre-occupations of the early Christian community in shaping the material which is incorporated in the Gospels, have shaken the easy confidence of Gore and his generation in regarding the Gospels as primarily and simply historical narratives. And whilst Gore has been proved right in rejecting the details of Schweitzer's view of Jesus as the apocalyptic figure, he completely misjudged the significance for later historical criticism of Schweitzer's insistence on the importance of eschatology for evaluating the religious situation into which Christianity was born. Gore's discussion of miracles is, of course, fired by his profound, almost wholly emotional, disagreement with the left-wing modernists of his day. His discussion is inevitably strongly polemical in character. Yet despite this, his conclusions are sound, and still valid, though we would be bound to clothe them in a different terminology. The possibility of an event occurring cannot be ruled out on any *a priori* grounds. The reformulation in modern scientific thinking of the concept of scientific law underlines this point. When an event happens which contravenes a scientific law, the scientist promptly revises his law. In a sense, the modern conception of a scientific law makes clear that it is not the kind of law that it is possible to transgress. Therefore the occurrence of miracles cannot be ruled out in advance by appeal to scientific law. Whether a miracle occurred is a matter of examining the evidence for the

alleged event. This is Gore's prescription, and it is as valid to-day as when he wrote it. Disagreement can arise over evaluation of the evidence, and theologians to-day, who have approached the same evidence with no *a priori* views in mind, have questioned the historicity of the Virgin Birth and the bodily Resurrection. Whilst Gore rightly stresses the need to examine and assess evidence for miraculous occurrences, he has not recognized the important point that in such questions, the more extraordinary the alleged occurrence appears to be—the greater its deviation from the normal—the greater will be the need to find overwhelming evidence of its occurrence to convince us of its actuality. It is precisely this point that apologists for miracles so frequently overlook. On Gore's excellent prescription of rationally weighing up the evidence, an examination of the New Testament evidence for miracles must arouse an attitude of cool, healthy scepticism concerning their actual occurrence, and this not because the evidence is necessarily "fishy" (it may be this also) but because there is far too little of it. The instinct of the left-wing critics Gore attacks was right, even though they can now be shown to have been right for the wrong reasons.

The Reconstruction of Belief is primarily a work of apologetic, and apologetic by its nature, reflecting the intellectual concerns of its time, very quickly becomes dated. Gore's work, although written in the early twenties, breathes the theological mood of the late Victorian period. Its author shares many of the qualities of the theological giants of his time—an immense energy, deep and fruitful reading, a readiness to tackle large issues, a refusal to shelter safely behind a narrow, concentrated specialism, and an underlying seriousness of purpose. Above all, it echoes on every page the great Liberal conviction that religion can and must satisfy the highest intellectual needs of man. Gore constantly argues his case, and he does not shrink from engaging in controversy. We may disagree with the arguments, but at least they are concerned with the central issues, and they usually command respect. His main weakness, ironically, is that in fact he is not prepared to follow reason and rational argument all the way, only most of the way. The sharp opponent of any *a priori* standpoint, he himself starts from an *a priori* acceptance of the classical formulation of Chalcedon. Within this framework he is most anxious to use reason and argument to establish the reasonableness of Chalcedon, but the acceptance of the starting point itself is not the result of rational dialectic but is based on the intuitive perception of an experience which came to him when he was eight years old.

There is nowadays something of a revival of interest in Bishop Gore. Since his death, theology has moved into the post-Liberal era, and the great Liberal belief in the reasonableness of religion is contemptuously dismissed. "Faith" and "Belief" are now the magic words. If the revival of interest in Gore leads to a sympathetic understanding of the essential character of the Liberal spirit in theology, which *The Reconstruction of Belief* embodies, it will do contemporary theology a very good turn.

T. A. Roberts.

On the Frontier: John Cowper Powys

The Rev. Patrick Bronte was not the only Victorian clergyman to beget a remarkable family of writers. The Rev. Charles Francis Powys, Vicar of Montacute in Somerset from 1886 to 1918, was, like Mr Bronte, a strict Evangelical; and he was to exercise an abiding if indirect influence on the writings of three of his sons, John Cowper, Theodore and Llewelyn Powys. Their highly individual books express three distinct movements of reaction from the social, moral and religious premisses of late-Victorian Christianity, and are the more interesting for being relatively uninfluenced by contemporary trends. The brothers achieved a limited fame in the 1930s, Theodore especially, and his quietly bitter fables of rustic life will always solace tender and pessimistic minds. Llewelyn's uninhibited paganism has worn less well, but he is an illuminating opponent, eloquent and noble. He is the sort of enemy Christianity needs.

John Cowper Powys is the only one of the three still alive. Now in his late eighties, blind in one eye but undeterred by that, he continues to write with unabated zest, a law unto himself. There is no other writer like him. Novelist, critic, poet and philosopher, in all his books he projects that magnetic, complex and indomitable spirit which is at once their medium and their theme. They represent a triumphant struggle, the victory of wit and will power over a complicated temperament.

You might call him a latter-day Marcionite, to the extent that he sees all evil as existent in the First Cause. Jesus thus becomes the type of all victims, and, in religious teaching, the exemplar of a misguided self-immolation. Neither John nor Theodore Powys ever quite shook off the influence of their powerful and single-minded father, for whom the discrepancy between Jehovah and the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ needed neither explanation nor apology. Such a creed was impossible for his eldest son, in whose writings escape is a dominating *motiv*. The pity is that the escape was never really complete. Like William Blake, he disbelieves passionately in the wrong God.

In his early manhood he was beset by fears and obsessions that might be called demonic. His salvation from madness can in part be attributed to the innate generosity and humility of his disposition; but it also owes much to his deliberate affirmation of what Wordsworth called "the pleasure that there is in life itself". His astonishingly frank *Autobiography* describes the inner thoughts and feelings of his formative years. It is a chronicle of his consciousness, an analysis of his fears and delights and manias. Reticent where others are concerned, he is an unsparing critic of himself, honestly admitting, for example, to those sadistic tendencies which are, for him, the supreme manifestation of evil in any human being. So too he admits to sexual obsessions, nervous aberrations, social complexes. This makes the book repellent to some people, and it is certainly an exacting business to read it. Powys is a highly repetitive writer, often

long-winded and a terror for parentheses; but his candour is wedded to a genial intelligence, his discursiveness to a relaxing opulence of phrase. If the book smacks of a confession from the psycho-analyst's couch in which the subject is also the psychiatrist, it is none the less rewarding for that.

This lone and prolonged battle against perversion and neurosis left its mark on all his earlier novels; and none of them explore the nature of evil so thoroughly as *Wolf Solent* (1929). The book is long, tortuous and frightening. All too vividly do the oppressive forces of heredity, fear, cruelty, lust and deception play in and about the person of Solent; John Cowper Powys himself, with "the curve of his hooked nose and . . . the rough thick eyebrows that overarched his deeply sunken grey eyes", with his sardonic humour, his agonizing sensibility, his animistic passion for sticks and stones. It is the story of a fight for life, at the end of which the hero is left confronting "the secret bestower of torture and pleasure", affirming in the face of an eternal hostility "endure or escape". Powys' subsequent philosophy progresses from "endurance *through* escape" to "escape through endurance", which is the fullest meaning that can be given to "the pleasure that there is in life itself".

Theologically he is a dualist, a necessary deduction for him from the facts of his own experience. In *The Meaning of Culture* he analyses men's reaction to the hypothetical First Cause as a blend of gratitude and defiance. If you love life at all you must have a God to thank: but so ugly and perverse and prevalent is evil that you are bound to protest to its originator. A man's justification is in defying this force of malice outside himself: Powys is acutely conscious of evil's objectivity as well as of its activity within himself. By the very nature of the First Cause men are strung between two opposing tendencies, a protracted agony which Powys' own philosophy of escape is designed to make bearable. Hence his books on the *art* of happiness, in which he dons the prophet's mantle, in his case the mantle of a genial Rabelaisian. His philosophy of laughter and defence of sensuality are profoundly rewarding, and make a good deal of Christian teaching on the joy of life in the body seem paltry and threadbare. And they are based on a shrewd understanding of what is elsewhere known as original sin.

> Our secret, natural attitude (to God) is not "holy" at all. It is not grave or pious or consecrated. It is whimsical, sly, stubborn, wayward, all by turns; it is changeable as the wind; it is essentially profane.[1]

His own moral creed might be summed up as: Live and let live; be as happy as you can; cultivate your capacity for enjoyment with all the wit and nervous energy you possess; avoid cruelty like the plague; remember your kinship with *all* living things; and be yourself without fear or shame. "To force yourself to enjoy endurance—*that* was the pleasure of life." Such a philosophy is the most sensible that the once-born man can follow. It certainly seems to have worked in the author's own case.

[1] *In Defence of Sensuality.*

The struggle between good and evil is apparent in all his novels, the good being the acceptance of life for what it is, the evil, the baleful desire to hurt and destroy. The most remarkable character study is that of Mr Evans in *A Glastonbury Romance,* torn pitifully between the two. All his leading characters are really aspects of Powys' own multifold personality—again and again we find the "magicians", the mystical philosophers, the sadists, the pariahs, the mockers, the self-renouncing saints, the neurotics, the honest Johns. These various projections of the author's temperament are harmonized within the controlling framework of the novel: it is like watching a process of salvation, the subduing of the demonic host. The effect on the reader is, as Kenneth Young has pointed out, one of release. "We have supped with horrors, jested with God, given rein to our most reprehensible fancies, and feel better for it."

The longest, finest and most unforgettable of these books is *A Glastonbury Romance* (1933). After reading it, Llewelyn Powys exultantly declared, "It swallows the Anglican faith as if it were a gnat—swallows up Christianity itself as though it were a single egg of caviare". Well, hardly that; what the book does do is evoke the dimension in which all religions have their being. The author himself calls it an attempt "to convey a jumbled-up and squeezed-together epitome of life's various dimensions". Jumbled up it certainly is, chaotic, exciting, bathetic as life itself. Imbued though he is with the spirit of the romantic novelists, Powys is no master of plot. His stories always disintegrate and lose shape. Everything is curiously molten, life as mediated through his own mercurial sensitivity.

The dominant symbol in the novel is Glastonbury itself, the embodiment of all the religions, legends and race memories of that part of the West Country where John Cowper Powys spent his formative years. If in theology he is a dualist, in religion he is animistic, and all his writing is filled with the sense of the infinite psychic complexity of nature. So too he sees the traditions and legends of Glastonbury as living things.

> Everyone who came to this spot seemed to draw something from it, attracted by a magnetism too powerful for anyone to resist, but as different people approached it they charged its chemistry, though not its essence, by their own identity, so that upon none of them it had the same psychic effect. This influence . . . was a material centre of force and yet an immaterial fountain of life. . . . This had doubtless come about by reason of the creative energies pouring into it from the various cults, which, consciously or unconsciously, sucked their life-blood from its wind-blown, gossamer-light vortex.

Here, in man's responsiveness to his environment, we approach the secret of his being. *A Glastonbury Romance,* rambling, bawdy, mystical, is a profoundly religious book, an affirmation of the mystery of life and of the untried potentialities of human experience.

Religious, but not Christian: the difference is fundamental. Nevertheless, Christian truth is not something imposed upon the material of life, but something which emerges through it. That

material is infinitely complex; the movement of the Spirit of Truth is swifter than light, more elusive than the wind; and the profound achievement of all Powys' novels is that they do not present a fictitious world of order but a vibrating web, of which every single human consciousness forms a part. His cult of sensitivity is essentially democratic.

Underlying his philosophy of "escape in endurance" is his conception of what he calls "the multiverse".

> There is not only one creator. There are as many creators as there are living creatures. Each creature creates. That is why the only sensible meaning of the word "universe" is the particular collection of created worlds that surrounds each creature. We each have our own universe, so that in any philosophical sense the word "universe" is nonsense. There is no such thing. There are only universes, and all these universes interlock and intertwine and melt into one another.[1]

This is, however, but to emphasize the loneliness of the individual, who, in coming to terms with himself, comes to terms with the life of which he is but a part. Beyond this, human knowledge cannot go. Widely read in the philosophers and meta-physicians, Powys is sceptical of any absolute revelation, and in the long run undesirous of one. All metaphysical questions are answered by the implacable negative of death. Like Dud No-Man in *Maiden Castle,*

> he could *not* live in a wild search for the life beyond life. One life at a time! . . . "Hold to the centre," he said to himself, "as you move on. The future's *not* everything."

Or with the Welsh chieftain, Porius,

> Such a chance-ruled chaos of souls, none of them without *some* fellow feeling, *some* kindliness, at least to their offspring, at least to their mates, at least to their friends, is a better thing than a world of blind authority, a world ruled by one Caesar or one God. . . .

The closeness of man's relationship with his environment permeates all Powys' best writing. He is intensely sensitive to the natural world; an acute observer of flowers and leaves, subtly responsive to scents and sounds, fascinated by old wooden gates, forlorn puddles in wayside lanes, withered grasses, tiled roofs, tumbledown fences. His mysticism is really an uncanny awareness of an actual physical and psychic relationship between man and inanimate nature. So the poet Taliessin, as he contemplated a piece of straw trodden into the ground,

> let his whole soul sink into a multiple consciousness of the material of our planet in its various immediate manifestations. The petal-scented honey still lingering on his tongue, the barley bread dissolving at its leisure in his stomach, the dry resinous odours from the distant fir-trees, the vague aromatic fragrances from various growths at the water's edge, the feeling of the empty air receding into fabulous distances in every direction, the feeling of the wet, deep-sunken rocks, sprawled over by the cool roots of vegetation, but leading down at last, ledge by vertiginous ledge, to the dry scoriac bones of the great mother, . . . all these Taliessin seemed to share

[1] *The Mountains of the Moon.*

> on something like equal terms with his unresponsive fellow-tellurian. But the mere fact that chance had led him to single out a particular piece of inanimate but organic matter, a wind-tossed wheat-stalk, whose non-sentience was on a par with that of any fragment from his own skeleton when once that skeleton was scattered to the winds, gave him a reason for saying: "You and I", or "you and me" to this lifeless object.[1]

Part Stoic, part Hedonist, part Dualist, part Pantheist, Powys is an infuriating writer to those who like to "place" their authors. But it is precisely this diversity which makes him so interesting. Unaffected by contemporary society or behaviour or opinions he "dances his dance", in letters now as once upon the lecturer's platform. He is one of the least deliberate and most spontaneous of 20th-century novelists, probably one of the greatest and certainly the most neglected: you will not find his name in many of the popular text books, for he is simply himself rather than an influence on others. But his novels open your eyes, quicken your senses, satisfy at one and the same time your craving for romance and your craving for matter-of-fact realism. By being true to himself he transcends himself: the artistic expression of his faith never hardens into dogmatism. His doctrine of God may be philosophically implausible, but it rationalizes an implausible experience—that of good and evil. His philosophy of escape may be amoral but it constitutes a thanksgiving for life as such. His cosmology may be pantheistic, but it issues in charity. His vision of life, in which charity and thanksgiving are dominant elements, is one in which the words Incarnation and Atonement have a relevance and a meaning: which is to say that it is true, and revelatory of the nature of human experience.

Glen Cavaliero.

Death in God's Design

Bede tells how one of the chief men of the kingdom of Northumbria likened the life of a man to the flight of a sparrow through the royal banqueting hall in the depths of winter. The sparrow comes out of the stormy darkness to enjoy momentary comfort in the warm room, and then vanishes again into the darkness; in a similar way man spends a short while on earth, but knows nothing of what precedes or follows this life. Christianity was commended by the counsellor as revealing certain knowledge about this outer darkness.

This has traditionally been described in the Protestant twofold and Catholic fourfold schemes of the hereafter. When either of these is treated as a blueprint for God's future activity it becomes at once invalid, since it is then attempting too precise a dogmatic formulation of the great variety of teaching contained in the biblical tradition. In any case, it may be doubted whether these systems do justice to the wealth of scriptural teaching; for example, the Bible nowhere explicitly speaks of the faithful departed as "going to heaven", and although the definition of heaven as "where God is" may be an

[1] *Porius.*

advance on older, spatial notions, it may be that the whole concept needs radical re-examination, more especially as it is difficult to conceive of anywhere "where God is not". Again, the character of hell changes when it is recognized that in the New Testament the term "eternal fire" does not refer to a place of everlasting torment, but rather to the fire which belongs to the coming age of eternity, when, in accordance with God's judgment, it will destroy the wicked.

It is fair to say that the patterns of thought we have inherited on this problem are breaking down as their weaknesses become apparent. In such a situation it is important to attempt a reconsideration of the biblical evidence, with a view to constructing some more adequate formulation of the doctrine of the hereafter. This is a not inconsiderable task, and here one problem alone will be raised—the question of how life beyond death fits into God's eternal purposes for mankind. It will not be answered, but certain suggestions will be made which might be found important after further investigation, and which may in any case usefully spotlight certain religious truths.

Above all else, it is vital to see the problem in strictly personal terms. Any answer that fails to do justice to the loving concern of God expressed both through and beyond history fails to meet the issues involved. It is thus not enough to attempt a history or a geography of the after-life, since so much more is required, nor can any mechanistic view be allowed, as if a gigantic machine were at work to see that men arrive safely at their destination.

It is also important to recognize that all statements about the hereafter must be images, the biblical answer to the complaint of Alice, "What is the use of a book without pictures?" It is only when they are treated as pictures that their full significance can appear. They describe what can be conveyed in no other way, since, while we can think what happened yesterday or what is likely to happen tomorrow, we cannot think in the same way about what happened before the world was or what is to happen after the world has ceased to be. The after-life belongs to a different world from that which we can handle, but a unity is given in and through human death, which can be known in this life but which also introduces man to the next. The centre of inquiry will, therefore, be the place of death within God's design and the consequent relation of this life to the next.

The Bible does not so much account for the existence of death, as interpret it theologically and relate it to the remainder of human experience. When God had formed man he set him in the Garden of Eden, the name of which was probably associated with a root meaning luxuriousness or delight. It was for this sort of existence that man was originally made, and it is to such an existence that God would still bring him. Ezekiel 36. 35 and Isaiah 51. 3 both speak of a future blessedness, which God promises Israel under the figure of the Garden of Eden, and Luke 23. 43 uses the LXX equivalent "paradise", already used in the intertestamental literature to denote a place of bliss above the earth, to express the way in which

the penitent thief will be with Jesus. Creation is thus linked with consummation in an image that (as may be illustrated from Ezekiel 31. 3–9) would greatly appeal to ancient Israel.

The intrusion of death is described in the story of the Fall. The intention of this story is to show what man is like and how he stands in relation to God. Sin is asserted to be the root cause of human misery and to have brought the divine judgment of death on the world. Because man is a sinner God has cursed him, the curse being the only possible alternative to a divine blessing; and the curse has involved the return of man to the dust out of which he was taken. Thus death results from the initiative of God in a world-situation that man has helped create. Yet in a sense, as Paul suggests in Romans 6. 23, death is the wages paid out by sin. The religious mind may properly stand aghast at the effects of death when set beside God's ways of love with us because death is the enemy of God. It is in continual conflict with the One who is Creator of Life, and indeed is Life; and Revelation 20. 14 looks forward to its ultimate destruction by God. It is "the last enemy that shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 15. 26).

This awareness of death as the enemy of God underlies Oscar Cullmann's interpretation of Gethsemane and his insight into the Cry of Dereliction as the experience of One who, while tied closer to the Father than any other man, felt as a result the horror and terror of being in the hands of God's great enemy all the more poignantly. The best interpretation of this aspect of Christ's work is probably to be found in the paintings of Grünewald, whose representation of Christ on the Cross in the Isenheim altarpiece has been shown to be modelled on the corpses in the Isenheim mortuary; Grünewald's Christ has so obviously come to terms with death. There is a certain docetism about the view that would save Christ from the full effect of meeting death; if death was not full of pain and trouble for Jesus, it is difficult to see how it can be full of joy for us. This is the point of Cullmann's comparison of the deaths of Socrates and Jesus, the one calm and among his disciples, the other alone and in agony. The contrast is not between different modes of execution in different historical circumstances, but between different attitudes to death. Jesus alone was able to recognize death for what it was, and so treat it on its merits; it is only through his action on our behalf that we are able to tackle it at all.

The Old Testament regards death as the decisive termination of human life, apart from two late passages (Isa. 26. 19, Dan. 12. 2) which are not typical of Hebrew thought. The dead are called *rephā'im,* or shades, the word probably meaning sunken or powerless ones. For the Israelite, man consisted of spirit and body joined in a firm unity, so that without the body man could not be properly said to exist. The dead inhabited Sheol, which is quite different from the later hell; it is the "land which is not a land", the place of gloom and despair and nothingness which has been emptied of everything that can in any way make life desirable; and above all else it is usually represented as distant from God. "For in death

there is no remembrance of thee: in Sheol who shall give thee thanks?" (Ps. 6. 5). There are hints, as in Amos 9. 2, that this is not the end, but that God's power extends even to Sheol; but this does not materially lighten the deep gloom that lies beyond death for the Israelite. This is paralleled by the equation of the verb "to defile oneself" with "to participate in mourning rites" in Leviticus 21. 1, for the dead had now fallen to the lordship of other powers than that of God and to mourn for them was to become unclean. There is also a stress laid on retaining the "remembrance" of the individual, even to the erection of a pillar by Absalom because he had no children to remember him (2 Sam. 18. 18); when a man's name passed from human memory he was no more.

In the time of Jesus the Sadducees held to these traditional Jewish beliefs, but the Pharisees had incorporated into Judaism the notion of a future life which contains reward or punishment dependent upon human conduct in this life. The Christian hope does not rest on the Pharisaic view, however, but rather upon an awareness of what God has achieved in Jesus. He was the "second Adam", sent by God to deal with human sinfulness as described in the story of the first Adam, representing humanity just as the Adam of Genesis does, but reversing in his triumphant conflict with death the curse which the first Adam had received. "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. 15. 22). Christ's realistic confrontation with death meant the end of death's rule over men, though as yet the end has not been consummated; but just as all men are described in the story of Adam as condemned to die, so those who belong to Jesus will be made alive because he is alive.

This is the significance of Jesus' words to Martha before Lazarus' tomb: "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die" (John 11. 25 f.). The resurrection is interpreted, not as a far distant event that will happen "at the last day", but rather as something that is on the earth because Jesus is among men. And so he raises Lazarus to represent beforehand his own rising from the dead. In Jesus dead and living are joined, and because of what he has done physical decay cannot mean that we are left behind by God in death. The sharp division between the living and the dead has been bridged by God, who has thereby shown that death cannot be justly seen as the end of true life and, too, that the dead cannot be regarded as wholly beyond either human ken or divine concern.

In fact, death is a liberation into a fuller relationship both with God and with one's fellows. Paul longs for liberation from his earthly body that he may know a deeper fellowship with God (2 Cor. 5. 1–8), and Jesus made clear in his answer to the question of the Sadducees that death only concealed a richer form of life. It was idle to ask about the husbands of a woman married seven times because the question ignored the power of God. "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven" (Matt. 22. 30). In the next life the joys of marriage

would be unnecessary since the richness of companionship man can find there would belong to the whole community of God. In common with much else that belongs to this earth, marriage would be superseded in being fulfilled, and would pass into something better. This fellowship is possible to some degree within the worshipping church even this side of the grave. The Sanctus begins: "Therefore with Angels and Archangels, and with all the company of heaven, we laud and magnify thy glorious name", and we are reminded that we share in an activity that joins us with the faithful departed. This is perhaps most evident in the Holy Communion, which brings us to the most holy place of all in our dealings with God, but it should characterize our whole worship, which takes its place within the total offering of the church to God.

This new life beyond death is further interpreted by the Bible as a part of God's new creation. The Seer tells how God will replace this present heaven and earth by a new heaven and a new earth, in which death will find no place. It will have been cast into the lake of fire, and so utterly destroyed. "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away" (Rev. 21. 4). In this establishing of God's new creation his design for the whole world will be perfectly completed. Man's part in this is to be given a new, resurrection body by God. If you ask, "What is this body like?" Paul replies, "You foolish man. You do not understand—this is to be a different body, a new body, one which belongs to the new order which God is bringing into being and of which you, as a redeemed person, are to be a part" (1 Cor. 15. 35–44). For "the first man (i.e. Adam) is of the earth, earthy: the second man (i.e. Christ) is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly" (1 Cor. 15. 47 f.). Those who belong to Jesus, who trust in him and love him, are no longer earthly beings but heavenly, and they are, therefore, intended for a heavenly existence hereafter: "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly" (15. 49). There is an appointed place for man in God's new creation.

As yet this creation is not completed, and Christians, who know its beginnings in their lives through the activity of the Holy Spirit, can only hope for what is to come, knowing that this hope has solid grounds. Meanwhile "we . . . groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (Rom. 8. 23). And not only we, for the whole of creation is in birthpangs until it "shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. 8. 21). We live in a time of transition when a new world is being born, and until that glorious event we and the whole of creation must expect to be afflicted with pain and torment. As God's purposes are worked out in the world there is bound to be conflict and difficulty, for this is inherent in the life of the created order. Yet through it all God is active, and in the triumphant living and dying of each Christian man the end is one step

nearer. When Jesus raised the dead, we have no reason to believe they did not die again in the course of time. Their first resurrection was important, but not all important, for the conclusion of all things is to be found, not here, but in God's new world.

A new statement might be built from such evidence as this. It would have to incorporate such concepts as the article of the Creed, "I believe . . . in the resurrection of the body", by itself a stumbling-block to many and often devoid of any religious value when it is repeated; and it would be able to escape from the strait-jacket of traditional formulation, which is patently insufficient and shows no signs of containing within itself seeds of renewal. It may be that concentration on the concrete reality death may help to supply a new approach. This is not a piece of imagery but a biological fact, and though the usual distinction between physical and spiritual death has turned it into a mythical event, it may be best seen as a grim fact that awaits every living creature. It is a part of the world that we know, and should not be hidden from our eyes under a shroud. Physical death is also a spiritual fact, and Christ's death was a physical death in bringing in a new spiritual order. His death was necessary for the realization of Christian life, and in both the love of God is focused. It is the assurance of this alone that can enable us to step into the hereafter with calm and joy, knowing that in death God is working out his purposes, even if shrouded of necessity in mystery, and leading on to fuller life. The imagery of this fuller life may be best understood in terms of what Christ has already done on earth, though it is impossible to reach an adequate expression, as the images themselves bear witness; but above all they must express something real to us as we are conscious of living within God's design and knowing his activity on our behalf in this world.

B. A. Mastin.

The Lord's Prayer and the Exodus Tradition

From within the fellowship of the Church the mind of Christ has been expounded to generation after generation, yet we know that the tradition handed down to us sometimes leaves us asking rather uncertainly what was indeed the mind of the Lord behind the spoken word. This situation seems particularly true when we turn to questions raised by the study of the Lord's Prayer.

Whether we choose the version of the Prayer from Luke 11 or Matthew 6, we are given the outline of a prayer which was especially associated with the Master, and which presumably contained the themes which he felt were most relevant to the situation of his disciples. If we believe that our Lord was preparing a group of disciples for the witness of the "last days", all of them soon to journey to Jerusalem in order that a new Exodus might be accomplished, is it not surprising that *the* prayer does not contain a greater sense of urgency? Instead, we seem to be given a "model prayer", echoing

themes from the tradition of Jewish worship, themes well known to the friends of Jesus. See, for instance, *Jesus, Master and Lord* by H. E. W. Turner, p. 133, where the Prayer is reconstructed almost word for word from rabbinic and liturgical literature of Judaism. That Jesus is composing a model prayer in this way seems as unlikely as that Jeremiah faced a Day of the Lord among his people by composing the acrostic poems of Lamentations.

Now it seems fairly certain that the pattern of the ministry of our Lord is governed by Caesarea Philippi and the Transfiguration, and that before his work could be finished, the friends of Jesus must be certain that the Lord was indeed among them, and would be among them throughout their mission. For our Lord himself, the darkest moment of Good Friday was at the point where he was himself brought to cry this very question: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"

The testing of the People of God in the New Age would reflect the story of the earlier Exodus from captivity. The last verses of John 16 promise the Church tribulation in the world, yet peace in the certainty of God's caring and God's guidance. The pilgrimage of the Church was to be blessed by a further hope—that the Promised Land was near. It was, as it were, the last day, the eve of the Sabbath, and "there remaineth therefore a rest to the people of God" (Heb. 4. 9).

Perhaps, then, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that as Jesus taught his disciples to pray, an imporant part of this prayer would be for that one thing needful, faith that the Lord was among them, and that he would supply their needs throughout the time which remained to the Church in the world, until the Sabbath dawned, and God's purpose in history came to an end.

Our Lord was soon to give his life a ransom for many, and the new Exodus (Luke 9. 31) would set his people free to begin their journey of faith. It seems, therefore, significant that following Exodus 14 and 15 the thought of our Lord would be brought to two events which follow immediately in Exodus 16 and 17—the care of God for his people in providing daily food in the wilderness, and how the people fell into the deadly danger of questioning the reality of God's care and his ability to see them through.

Here is a framework of thought which strongly calls to mind the central part of the Lord's Prayer:

(i) The gift of daily bread.
(ii) The trespass of the people, leading to
(iii) Their tempting God— "Is the Lord among us, or not?"
(iv) Deliverance from the adversary—the victory over Amelek as a victory of faith—"The Lord my refuge" (LXX).

Within this framework, the Greek words that are translated as "daily" and "temptation" in the A.V.—*ἐπιούσιος* and *πειρασμός*—come to mind as words which have given rise to much discussion in relation to the Lord's Prayer.

(*a*) ἐπιούσιος: For a summary of possible interpretations of this word which is found nowhere else, see the article by Dr D. Y. Hadidian in *New Testament Studies,* Vol. 5, p. 75. Discussion here takes us back to the suggestion that the Curetonian and Sinaitic Syriac and the Acts of Thomas have the right meaning of ἐπιούσιος—"set before us this day (or each day) the bread of continuity". Another well-known suggestion follows the Gospel according to the Hebrews —"our bread of the morrow give us today". Origen and John of Damascus refer to ἐπιούσιος as "an earnest of the age to come".

In Exodus 16 these interpretations are implied in the story of the manna.

The bread of continuity:

"The people shall go out and gather a certain rate every day, that I may prove them, whether they will walk in my law, or no" (v. 4).

"And the children of Israel did eat manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited; they did eat manna, until they came unto the borders of the land of Canaan" (v. 35).[1]

The bread of the morrow give us to-day.

"And it shall come to pass, that on the sixth day they shall prepare that which they bring in; and it shall be twice as much as they gather daily" (v. 5).

"To-morrow is the rest of the holy sabbath unto the Lord . . . that which remaineth over lay up for you to be kept until the morning" (v. 23).

"See, for that the Lord hath given you the sabbath, therefore he giveth you on the sixth day the bread of two days . . . so the people rested on the seventh day" (vv. 29, 30).

Thus the "bread of two days" reveals God's care day by day, but also points forward to the approaching holy sabbath which remains to the people of God. It is not difficult to see how the eucharistic bread represented the "bread of two days" for the early Church, the sacrament of God's sustaining presence, but also an earnest of the eschatological meal of the coming age. "Therefore 'epiousios' bread . . . provides at once health and vigour and strength to the soul and imparts a share of its own immortality (for the word of God is immortal) to him who eats of it" (Origen: *De Oratione,* 27. 9).

(*b*) πειρασμός: The problem raised by this word is familiar enough, and is clearly stated in James 1. 13—"Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man."

"It is, I think, a question that deserves discussion (unless the Saviour commands us to pray for the impossible), how we can be bidden, when the whole of men's life on earth is a temptation, to pray that we enter not into temptation" (Origen: *De Oratione,* 29. 1). The answer usually given is that we are bidden to pray that

[1] This demonstration of God's continual care is closely related to the symbolism of the shewbread (Ex. 25. 30). "The bread was an 'offering' to Yahweh in which he was recognized as the source of the earth's fruitfulness and of Israel's sustenance" (*Interpreter's Bible*).

we may not be tempted beyond our strength to resist, although in 1 Cor. 10. 13 St Paul has sternly reminded his readers that God will not allow such a situation to arise, and they cannot evade responsibility by blaming God for imposing too severe a test.[1]

The Prayer clearly supposes a real conflict and a powerful adversary, ideas which have been recently dealt with by K. G. Kuhn in "New Light on Temptation, Sin, and Flesh in the New Testament" (*The Scrolls and the New Testament*).

"Through the Angel of Darkness, however, even those who practise righteousness are made liable to error. . . . Moreover, all men's afflictions and all their moments of tribulation are due to this being's malevolent sway. All of the spirits that attend upon him are bent on causing the sons of light to stumble. Howbeit, the God of Israel and the Angel of His Truth are always there to help the sons of light" (*Manual of Discipline*).

Luther, in the Small Catechism, has come close to this same idea: "God of course tempts no one, but we ask in this prayer, that God should shield and preserve us, so that the devil, the world and our flesh should not deceive us nor lead us into false faith, despair and other great shame and vice: and so that if we are attacked with these, we should nevertheless win in the end and hold the victory."

Are we not near the heart of the problem of πειρασμός when Luther refers to despair? The reality of the Christian conflict is certain, the pilgrimage of the Church must lie through many obstacles, and the supreme danger will always be that the people of God may hesitate, look fearfully backwards, doubt the power of God to guide, and be led into *the* temptation—tempting God and saying, "Is the Lord among us, or not?"

Might it not be a possible interpretation of the mind of the Lord that he is teaching his Church to pray that she may never fall into despair? Many within the Church are reminded of this danger Sunday by Sunday—"harden not your hearts: as in the provocation, and as in the day of temptation in the wilderness; when your fathers tempted me: proved me, and saw my works" (cp. Wisdom 1. 2).

In *New Testament Studies*, Vol. 5, pp. 174–87, Dr D. Daube has discussed a possible influence of the Passover Eve expositions of the Exodus on the early structure of the Gospels, and although the Cross and Resurrection were yet to come, perhaps it is not too improbable that the Prayer reflected the Lord's meditations upon the saving events of the past which had fashioned the people of God for whose sake he had come.

The disciples were taught to pray as those who were to understand that a new age was fulfilling the pattern of the past. The Lord's Prayer was given primarily, not as a static model of what a

[1] Mark 14. 38 raises the same question—what does πειρασμός mean here for our Lord? Deliverance from testing in too severe a form—in the next few hours or in the Messianic tribulations? Surely more simply, that in the context of Mark 14. 27 our Lord bids the disciples pray that their "falling away" may not lead to utter despair through the dark hours of the Exodus-Passion.

good prayer should be, but as a means of dedication for the dynamic mission of the Body of Christ.[1]

R. F. Cyster.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

CHRISTIANS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Dear Sir,

As one of the authors of the article on this subject to which Mr Baird and Mr Jude replied, I am persuaded that we are not yet talking to each other, but to false images we entertain of what the other man really cares for. As an example, Mr Baird says, "let us admit that the West would not use the bomb first", and earlier, "we must start by trusting the Russians since they are men like ourselves". My difficulty is that I cannot make the first admission because the West, in fact, has used the bomb first, and since I also believe the Russians are men like ourselves I must reckon with the possibility that they would do likewise if they had a chance. Again, I deeply agree with Mr Jude's reflections on the falsity of a Christian concern for safety as the main objective to be sought. Yet in this matter we are thinking not so much of our own skins but of the responsibility we have to help preserve the life and health of other men and women, and their safety may not be lightly imperilled by our actions.

In part our disagreement may be reduced not so much by debating with each other as by listening to one another, and it is greatly to be hoped that the conference arranged by the C.N.D. with people of other views, to take place in September, will lead at least to greater mutual respect than has existed up till now. In part we all need to expose more thoroughly the Christian convictions which lead us to our particular conclusions. I myself have tried to do this in a recent publication, *Christians and Power Politics,* published by the S.C.M. Press, and it is intended not simply to argue a case but to establish the Christian framework in which the discussion should

[1] I am most grateful to Prof. C. F. D. Moule for helpful discussion related to this note.

proceed. I can only hope that it avoids some of the misunderstandings which are perhaps inevitable in a brief magazine article.

Yours faithfully,
ALAN R. BOOTH.

59 BRYANSTON STREET,
LONDON, W.1.

THE MOTHERS' UNION

DEAR SIR,

The Bishop of Bedford, in his kind reply to my article, makes, if I may use his words, what "at first sight seems a strong case, but does it in fact hold water?"

The Bishop writes: "The mere size of the organization has nothing whatever to do with its principles." I wonder has the analogy of monasticism anything to say here. While there are only a few scattered communities there is no problem, but if the movement grows so much that, although in theory power is still in the hands of the episcopate in practice it is in the hands of the abbots, has not a new element entered the situation which gives a new and added responsibility?

The Bishop writes: "The M.U. does not want to become a Churchwomen's Society." I wonder has the analogy of Establishment anything to say here. There are those who want the benefits of it without the fact or obligations of it. If the M.U. does not want official status, then ought not the constitutional and moral position of the parish priest to be somewhat eased? At present the M.U. cannot effectively function without the support of the parish priest, and therefore he is either obliged to play or to be put morally "in the dog house" if he will not.

One cannot tackle fully the subject of "Christian marriage and the second civil contract" in a letter. May I simply say (i) the Bishop's letter seems completely to ignore every chapter except the last in Dr A. R. Winnett's book *Divorce and Re-marriage in Anglicanism*, published by Macmillan, 1958. (ii) He says that the M.U. is "only in fact expressing what is the official mind of the Church". But that was just my point. It is not. In Mary Sumner's time the Church found no great difficulty in marrying the innocent party of a divorce, e.g. Lambeth Conference, 1887. (iii) Bishops are able to admit certain re-married divorced persons to Communion. This fact is given by the Bishop of Bedford a particular juridical and theological interpretation. The fact is the official mind of the Church, the interpretation has no such authority; but it is through such an interpretation the M.U. are able to exclude some mothers who are communicants from membership of their society.

Yours sincerely,
ERIC JAMES.

113 WELLS WAY,
CAMBERWELL, S.E.5.

DEAR SIR,

As two people in the Church of England who for twenty-eight years have been constantly in touch with those involved in broken marriages, and the suffering they bring, we have long felt it a tragedy that the chief organization for women in our Church is the one whose constitution forbids its fellowship to those most in need of the help it could give. We therefore welcome Mr James's article in your June issue, and hope that those responsible at Mary Sumner House may feel moved by it to continue their great work for "the sanctity of marriage", but with a more liberal interpretation of that phrase than is the case at present.

In the case of re-marriage after divorce, we have discovered that we are often faced with a *fait accompli*. A second marriage has been entered into, in which both parties are determined to make a success, and are anxious to live as worshipping members of the Church. To treat such people with condescension, or censoriousness, is useless. But whereas over and over again the *bishops* have shown understanding of their needs, this has been undermined by the rigidity of the M.U., for, as Mr James points out, the wives are forbidden the fellowship of the women's society, although together they are (in suitable cases) welcomed to the fellowship of the altar.

What we suggest is needed is not a new society for women, but that the M.U. should interpret its objects in a more realistic spirit—may we be forgiven if we say, a more Christian spirit.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding that might arise from the use of our normal signatures, we beg to sign ourselves,

Yours faithfully,

MERVYN and LOUISE CHARLES-EDWARDS.

FROXMERE COURT,
CROWLE,
WORCESTER.

21 *June* 1961.

THE PROMISES

DEAR SIR,

Prof. E. C. Ratcliff says that "The Preparation" is an inexact caption in the York Service for Infant Baptism (THEOLOGY, November 1960). More inexact, I think, is the caption "The Promises" in the English Liturgical Commission's Report and the Church in Wales revisions as well as in *York*. When the candidate answers "I believe" to the credal questions he is not making promises but declaring or confessing his faith. "The Declaration" or "The Confession of Faith" would be better, and would help to show the importance of these questions.

The traditional, very close connexion between the confession of faith and the baptism itself suggests that it might be better to omit the caption "The Promises" and move the caption "The Baptism" back to above the credal questions (see E. C. Whitaker: *The Proposed Services of Baptism and Confirmation Reconsidered*. S.P.C.K.

3s. 6d.). The other questions on renunciation and obedience could be moved or omitted, as Mr Whitaker suggests. In the case of *York* and *Wales* the Blessing of the Water would, of course, have to be moved to the other side of the questions. I notice one change for the worse at this point in the Adult Baptism of the English and Welsh Commissions, a change which conflicts with the intention to ascribe greater importance to the act of faith. The questions are now put to all the candidates together, and they all answer together (with those who "have already been baptized and are now to be confirmed" in the English report). If this is done we shall get a hesitant and mumbled "I believe", like the answer "I do" at many Confirmation Services. In the 1661 and 1928 Prayer Books the candidates are asked the questions "severally". I hope that this arrangement is restored to our revisions. Each candidate would then be called forward in turn (with his godparents in Infant Baptism), asked the credal questions, and also, perhaps, the question, "Wilt thou be baptized in this faith?" and then baptized. This would mean that the act of faith and the pouring of the water would be so closely linked that they could not very well have separate captions (see *Baptism and Confirmation*, pp. x f., where the Commission seems to promise to do what is suggested here).

Yours faithfully,
F. M. Jones.

Penrhyncoch Vicarage,
Aberystwyth.

[The editor will be abroad and unable to deal with correspondence until September 23.]

BOOK REVIEWS

History and Myth. The World Around Us and the World Within. By David Cox. Darton, Longman and Todd. 1961. 18s.

After his illuminating critical study of the Jungian "individuation" in the light of Christian soteriology, Mr David Cox has now ventured on the vaster task of evaluating the mythic and historical components of the Christian faith, starting from the question: Why do all Christians, even the most modernistic, *want* to believe that the Gospel record is historically true? This he sets out to answer, first of all by summarizing the reasons that can be advanced for regarding the historic and factual elements as of secondary importance or even expendable.

Myths are conceived, in this study, as projections or images of what Jung calls the "archetypes" (of the nature of which Mr Cox's exposition is refreshingly lucid). The close correspondence between the myths of the various great religions is explained by their being projections of the same "archetypal" forms, by which the psyche apprehends the deepest and most universal modalities of human existence. In the light of modern knowledge it is quite indisputable that many of the mythic motives of the earlier religions are very

exactly paralleled in the Gospel drama. We are now used to the idea of mythicized history; but here we have historically realized myth. "If one treats as myth everything in the Gospel that looks like myth, there is nothing left over . . ." for mythic elements are "woven into" the record throughout. The archetypes of human meaning and destiny, everywhere else projected in mythic imagery, are here represented by a factual realization.

So far, this exegesis may not be very new, but the author makes good use of it in explaining why Christianity would not work if it were *no more* than the supreme mythology which, of course, it *also* is. The reason for this is reflected in the well-known limitation of psychotherapy—that it cannot help turning the attention inwards towards the psychic contents (images) themselves; and although this has its therapeutic function—by relieving and counter-balancing the pressures of the outer world—it is, in itself, against the natural flow of life, and more is needed for reconciliation between man's "two worlds". The forces of the psyche clamour and impel from within, because they are seeking realization in external, empirically communicable realities. This principle, that human life has a "direction", is very well demonstrated here, with the correlative that it demands and depends upon the theophany in which myth and history find their mutual consummation.

David Cox is not only a very clear, but an original thinker. To me, at least, there is illuminating novelty in what he says, for instance, about the impossibility of *completing* either an outer-empirical or an inner-psychological view of existence—I mean, the way in which he relates the facts that empirical science comes up against the subjective in the forms of relativity and then of indeterminacy; and that psychology finds itself faced with the phenomena of "synchronicity"—a difficult concept for those not versed in Jungian lore, but one which he explains admirably. The transition from all these, and other, aspects to the Eucharist and the Atonement brings the work to a good modern, orthodox conclusion.

Those who wrote the symposium on *Christianity and Psychiatry*, published some years ago by the Christian Frontier Council, will especially welcome this book as good work in progress towards the Christian psychology to which they aspired. And theologians who are seeking to extract the theological meaning of the contemporary dominance of the empirical should not neglect to read a work which demonstrates, so capably, that their goal is not to be reached without working, *pari passu*, upon the modern discoveries in psychology.

PHILIP MAIRET.

LEWES.

OUTWARD AND VISIBLE. By Basil Minchin. Darton, Longman and Todd. 1961. 21s.

It is a regrettable fact that the Liturgical Movement in England has so far not influenced modern church building to anything like

the extent that it has done on the continent. Amongst the reasons for this failure of impact must be included the ignorant conservatism of many committees and congregations. To dispel this ignorance and to open the way to a constructive approach to the relation of liturgy and architecture popular books of a non-specialist kind are needed, and it is into this category that Mr Minchin's study falls.

In his first part, he gives a survey of buildings for worship, their plan, arrangement and furniture, from the earliest days of the house-church to the present day. This is well and clearly done, and the result is a very readable handbook suitable for the layman. It has to be acknowledged, however, that Mr Minchin's account suffers from a number of unsupported statements and also from inaccuracies. Thus one may question his denial that the side-chapel at Ostia was a baptistery if one compares its inscription with Cyprian, Ep. 73. 10. One may suggest that he has failed to appreciate the character of Byzantine architecture, which has not so much a vertical "up-there" effect as a hanging atmosphere, so ably characterized by O. Demus in his *Byzantine Mosaic Decoration* (1947). One may point out that he has lumped together renaissance, mannerist and baroque architecture all under "renaissance", and that his so-called "Jesuit" style was the outcome not so much of the cult of the reserved sacrament as of the desire for audibility. The evidence is scarcely sufficient to support the thesis that celebration with the back to the people spread from Syria, and the discussion of the Syrian bemas could have been illuminated by two articles in *Cahiers Archéologiques* (J. Lassus and G. Tchalenko, "Ambons syriens", V, 1951, pp. 75–122; J. Dauvillier, "L'ambon ou bêmâ dans les textes de l'église chaldéenne", VI, 1952, pp. 2–30). To suggest that congregational pews were introduced in the 10th century is incorrect, since they would appear to have spread into the body of the church from the chantry chapels in the 15th and 16th centuries.

To attempt so vast a survey in so small a compass is inevitably to risk criticism of this kind, and it is unfortunately apparent that Mr Minchin is not as familiar as he might be with the original sources. Thus to state that Eusebius wrote his Ecclesiastical History "at the end of the fourth century", when he died in 339, and to quote Cyril's Mystagogical Catecheses as Chap. 21, when he, or someone, wrote five separate lectures, scarcely inspires confidence.

In his second part, Mr Minchin considers certain details of the Eucharistic action, in particular the offertory and the communion, and the ritual and ceremonial movements of the priest. His commendation of the symbolism of the one loaf, of celebration facing the people and of standing in the priestly posture for the "consecration" prayer are commonplaces to those already familiar with the Liturgical Movement and with its aim to bring the people into more effective participation in the Church's worship, but they are likely to strike the uninitiated as novel. They could not do better than read Mr Minchin's persuasive account.

Despite doctrinaire statements and occasional slips, the general picture given would appear to be sound, and for this reason the

book may be commended to the layman who is looking for an introduction to the subject as a whole.

J. G. Davies.

The University,
Birmingham.

Six Hundred New Churches. By M. H. Port. S.P.C.K. 1961. 50s.

The Commissioners' churches, sometimes known as Waterloo or Million churches, have to date had a poor press. In most general architectural histories they are dismissed as dreary "God-boxes", built with maximum economy and minimum aesthetic quality, and it was left to Mr Betjeman to declare recently that they had a "dignity and coherence which we can recognise today".

In making them the subject of a thesis, and subsequently of this book, Mr Port is concerned not merely to write of brick and plaster, Gothic turrets and Grecian bell towers, but to examine the early 19th-century approach to the problem of church extension. One hundred pages are devoted to a meticulous survey of churches built under the Commission between 1818 and 1856, giving details of style, cost and accommodation, with a list of the architects employed and a number of good illustrations. As a work of reference it will prove invaluable, and should take its place with Pevsner and Betjeman among the necessary equipment of the serious church hunter.

The main body of the book is a chronological account of how the Commission came into being and how it fulfilled its function. It is a most careful inquiry, and Mr Port introduces his readers to Commissioners, lay and clerical, architects and administrators, through a succession of meetings, committees, boards and reports. He tells his story coolly and without sign of great enthusiasm or excitement. But this perhaps is only fitting. The impression that he leaves is that none of those involved possessed any really passionate conviction about what they were doing. They were acting less as missionaries to a new urban heathen than as supporters of the established government who feared that the swarming millions in mines and mills might burst into open revolution. Morals could be inculcated only by religious principles, and without them the nation could never prosper. Their churches were thus to be bulwarks, preventing the worst excesses in these breeding-grounds of crime.

Their regulations concerning internal arrangement amounted to a determination that the minister might be heard throughout the church, whether preaching or praying, and that the altar should stand in a sanctuary recess, surmounted by panels bearing the creed, commandments and Lord's prayer. They had no strong feelings about the relative merits of Grecian and Gothic (how different from the later Victorian belief that Early English was the only truly religious style), though they seem to have accepted the prevalent view that Grecian was more fitted for the town, Gothic for the country. Their thoughts centred almost wholly on the problem of providing "a proper accommodation for the largest number of persons

at the least expense". Economy was their lodestar. Thus the designs presented by the Crown architects—Nash, Soane and Smirke—were all judged by a means test. Instead of adopting some general plan, as Archdeacon Wollaston suggested in 1819, plans of local architects were submitted to salaried surveyors, who checked such matters as the number of sittings and the constructional stability. The churchmen had in fact failed, as they have so constantly failed since, to provide the architects with any adequate brief. The result was a box-like building, with galleries running the length of the walls, supported on cast-iron columns, within which the seating was divided between the rented and the free.

As numbers of these churches are at this moment being pulled down in the course of slum clearance, one is tempted to ask whether in fact they have served their purpose well. Was the parochial system the best answer to the evangelizing of industrial areas? The means by which a new parish is created and its church erected reflects the multiplicity of conflicting interests and rights involved, and at once invites comparison with the Dissenting chapel for which it is only necessary to take out a licence to build. An Act of Parliament adds immensely to the expense and is a lengthy matter, but is necessary to prevent future legal uncertainties. Once more the failure of the church is seen to be due less to an unawareness of its problems than to a lack of flexibility in its institutions and a slowness in its procedure.

Some readers, and particularly subscribers to this journal, may well regret that Mr Port does not seem to recognize the wider implications of his survey and has not more to say on such matters. If he had compared this period of church extension with that in the East End under Queen Anne a hundred years before, or again with the movement which reached its zenith in the 1870s with Butterfield and Pugin, he might have come to some valuable conclusions about the changing attitude to the size and siting of new parishes, and the extent to which the building dictates the form of worship and contributes towards the creation of a worshipping community. The question remains whether successful church building does not always depend upon an alliance of theologians and architects, for churches in every age must reflect the worshipping needs of contemporary society.

Esther de Waal.

Cambridge.

Christians in an Industrial Society. By Richard Taylor. S.C.M. Press. 1961. 8s. 6d.

I recommend Richard Taylor's book as the best introduction for anyone who wants to get the "feel" of what Industrial Mission is about. Admirably he achieves his aim to provoke thought and to raise questions on the positive role of the Church in industrial society, and the initiatives which Christians ought to take. His brief sketches of particular individuals throw light on the predicament of men who feel the burden of responsibility in a changing world, and

yet find the Church unable to help them. In a vivid bit of reporting he outlines the scope of industrial mission work at present in hand, and with commendable restraint refrains from facile judgment.

In his estimate of what has been achieved he notes that the most significant differences are not in method but in outlook, therefore the way ahead for the Church is through a deeper theological understanding, " a more radical approach, which will produce a synthesis, and not a mixture, of the older views" (p. 54).

In view of the fact that the book is meant to provoke thought, I would put three questions against the assumptions underlying the conclusions in the last three chapters:

(1) At what point can you or should you draw a line between Christian and non-Christian in industry? An essential fact to respect is the solidarity of the working group, whereas Christianity has too often been divisive in the wrong way and on the wrong grounds. Further, if we accept that "to become a Christian is to respond to God's activity in the world and to become committed to his purposes" (p. 88), then we must also accept that this is a very gradual process. Over months and years a man may become more aware of God's activity in the world and slowly more committed to him. If this process is to go on naturally, it is hardly helpful to draw distinctions between those who at a particular moment happen to have "crossed the line" (however we may conceive this) and those who haven't.

(2) Is there to be no change in the Church as we know it? If (p. 124) "it is a long, slow . . . and painful process by which people come to realise that they cannot do without the riches of the Church's worship", is this entirely their fault? Must they accept the Church as it is—divisions and all? Let us have a more radical approach to our understanding of the Church, so that it may be seen to be stretching out into industry to support the "lonely" Christians there. And with this let us have a more realistic doctrine of the ministry and of the laity.

(3) What pitfalls and dimensions have been overlooked in the suggestions on education and training of Christians in industry? We have a long way to go before we can speak with assurance about our policy and syllabus. Those most estranged from the Church and those most deeply involved in industry can often be helped only in the situation itself. Much of the training work will be the better for being empirical and on the spot. The key thought here is that "training in Christianity . . . will take place in the context of relationships" (p. 112). The snag of much Church training has been the drawing away of the individual from his proper milieu and relationships.

Richard Taylor emphasizes that in industry "a state of continued change is normal" (p. 9). This is also true of Industrial Mission and much that is written here as true in 1959–60 is no longer true of 1961–2.

Margaret Kane.

Sheffield.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE MEANING AND PRACTICE OF PRAYER. By Carol Graham. Published for the Senate of Serampore College by the Christian Literature Society. The Christian Students' Library, No. 17. Re. 1.50.

The aim of this book is to give practical guidance in prayer to theological students and other Christians. Written in the first place for Christians in South India, it is hoped that it may be translated into other Asian languages. Two things are particularly worthy of note. First, great stress is laid on the place of the Bible in prayer. The meaning of prayer is understood in its light, and the practice of prayer built up on its use. The Bible passages are admirably chosen and developed, though one would not necessarily agree with all the theological assumptions. Secondly, it is to be noted that the book achieves its practical purpose. Besides being the outcome of personal experience in prayer, it is clearly based on wide experience of introducing others to the practice of prayer. This practical quality is particularly valuable in the passage on "The Sacrament of the Common Life" (p. 72), and in the suggestions made on the relation of individual prayer to the corporate worship of the Church (pp. 85–8). No one should be put off by the style, which is not entirely free from a wordiness: it suggests something less down to earth than the book actually is.

MARGARET KANE.

SHEFFIELD.

THE MAKING OF THE BIBLE. By William Barclay. PROPHETS OF ISRAEL: (1) ISAIAH. By George Knight. THE WISDOM OF ISRAEL. By John Paterson. Lutterworth Press. 1961. 5s. each.

These three volumes are among the first to be published in a new Anglo-American venture to be known as "Bible Guides": aimed, we are told, at "non-theologically equipped readers who want to know what the Bible is about", the whole series to be complete in twenty-two volumes. They are attractively produced and, by current standards, reasonably priced.

Of these three, the outstanding one is Prof. Knight on Isaiah. The book is clearly set against the whole Old Testament background, though it is perhaps questionable whether quite so much stress should be given to the Sinai covenant theme as the background of the thought of Isaiah ben-Amoz. It is gratifying to find a more positive approach than has sometimes been customary to the problem of Isaiah 40–66 and the relation of these chapters to the first part of the book; and in this section we find again Prof. Knight's views on the Servant of the Lord which will be familiar to readers of his *Christian Theology of the Old Testament*. It is certainly theologically illuminating to see traits representing Yahweh himself in the

suffering servant of Isaiah 53, though not all would agree that it is critically justifiable.

Prof. Paterson's book deals only with Job and Proverbs. He gives a useful account of the structure of Job, and expounds the book's main themes very lucidly in a short compass. The account of Proverbs is less successful; the book does not easily lend itself to exposition, and to treat this and other Wisdom writings primarily as the product of Hebrew humanism seems insufficient in view of studies in comparable literature carried out in recent years.

Finally, Dr Barclay gives a clear, straightforward account of the formation of the Canon of Scripture, in terms of a critical orthodoxy which is being questioned in many quarters, but can still fairly be regarded as the regnant hypothesis to which new students should first be introduced.

R. J. Coggins.

St Stephen's House,
Oxford.

Hebrew Thought compared with Greek. By T. Boman. S.C.M. Press. 1960. 21s.

A Study of Hebrew Thought. By C. Tresmontant. Desclée and Co. 1960. Belg. frs. 150.

The Sacred Languages. By P. Auvray, P. Poulain, A. Blaise. Burns and Oates. 1960. 8s. 6d.

For more than a quarter of a century it has been a commonplace in theological writings that the Christian faith cannot be properly understood without a study, not only of the Old Testament background of certain New Testament words, but also of Hebraic ways of thought. Such investigations have commonly drawn attention to the differences between Jewish and Greek modes of thinking, usually to the discredit of the latter. Although some rather wild assertions have sometimes been made on this subject, there can be no doubt about the importance of the study of the Hebraic background of Christianity.

A valuable contribution to this discussion was made in 1952 by Dr Boman, a Norwegian scholar, in a book published in German. Unfortunately, it had to wait until 1960 before appearing in an English translation (three years later than the Japanese version). Boman believes that "The idiosyncrasy of a nation or family of nations, a race, finds expression in the language peculiar to them" (p. 27). He therefore compares and contrasts the Hebrew and Greek languages and modes of thought under the following headings: dynamic and static thinking, impression and appearance, time and space, symbolism and instrumentalism, and logical thinking and psychological understanding. Although he does full justice to the differences between the two outlooks on life, he avoids a facile exaggeration of them, and also draws attention to a number of similarities.

This book makes great demands on the reader, both because the argument is not always very clearly presented and because the discussion of matters in different spheres of knowledge could adequately be judged only by a polymath. However, it repays careful study even by those who, like the present reviewer, lack such a qualification. It is the most thorough investigation of its kind, and shows a praiseworthy independence of judgment. Again and again it suggests fruitful ways of looking at the language of the Bible, and challenges the reader to consider what this language really means. The chapter on impression and appearance is particularly stimulating.

However, the stimulus of the book is frequently to disagreement, since many of the views advanced by Boman are highly questionable. Perhaps the most important example in his treatment of the Hebrew verb. In his exposition of the dynamic character of Hebrew thought, he maintains that the Hebrew verb is always dynamic. He therefore has to account for the fact that some verbs denote a state such as sitting or lying. Since it appears to be axiomatic to Boman that a verb cannot have "two meanings which to our way of thinking are opposed to one another" (p. 29), he argues that, when a Hebrew verb appears to denote a state, it still suggests the idea of acting or arriving at that state. It is still dynamic, and the conclusion is drawn that "motionless and fixed being is for the Hebrews a nonentity; it does not exist for them" (p. 31). Against this argument it may be pointed out that the English verbs "to sit" and "to lie" also denote both a state and an action; yet it would be rash to draw from this fact any conclusions about the dynamic nature of English thought.

Similarly, Boman's discussion of the Hebraic understanding of time depends, in part, on an interpretation of the Hebrew tenses in psychological terms. But it seems to me that he fails to do justice to theories which are not satisfied with a purely psychological explanation, but try to reconstruct the development of the tenses against the background of the cognate languages. For example, although Boman refers to Prof. G. R. Driver's *Problems of the Hebrew Verbal System* on another matter, he does not discuss his account of the Hebrew tenses. Nevertheless, though some of Boman's linguistic arguments are thus open to question, there is also much to command agreement, and his book is certainly very stimulating.

Dr Tresmontant's book covers some of the same ground as Boman's, but he is not primarily concerned with an historical comparison of Hebrew and Greek thought. He examines the teaching of the Bible about creation, anthropology and understanding, and seeks to draw out their metaphysical implications for Christian faith to-day. These implications are compared and contrasted with some of the great systems of thought in the history of philosophy.

Finally, the authors of the little book on *The Sacred Language* do not set themselves the profound theological objectives of Boman and Tresmontant. Their purpose is only to describe clearly and briefly the chief characteristics of the Hebrew, Aramaic and post

classical Greek and Latin languages. They succeed very well in fulfilling this purpose.

J. A. EMERTON.

CAMBRIDGE.

IRRATIONAL MAN. By William Barrett. Heinemann. 1961. 21s.

GOD, MAN AND SATAN. By Roland Mushat Frye. Princeton University Press: O.U.P. 1961. 30s.

MARTIN BUBER AND CHRISTIANITY. By Hans Urs von Balthasar. Harvill Press. 1961. 15s.

Irrational Man is another, but lucid and interesting, book on existentialism, which describes the historical origins of this philosophy, with its companion movements in art and literature, and relates it to the contemporary position of religion. The author draws on Swift's description of Laputa, and on Dostoevsky and Pascal, to attack the concept that man is primarily a rational being. He sees the fears of modern man epitomized in the Bomb. "Here surely the ordinary man begins to catch a fleeting glimpse of that Nothingness which both artist and philosopher have begun in our time to take seriously. The bomb reveals the dreadful and total contingency of human existence. Existentialism is the philosophy of the atomic age" (p. 57). There are useful chapters on Kierkegaard, Nietzche, Heideggre and Sartre, and one conclusion is the implicitly Christian statement that "all human truth must not only shine against an enveloping darkness, but . . . such truth is even shot through with its own darkness". The great virtue of this book is that it is based on how people really do think and feel and not on how the writer thinks they ought to feel. Because of this, and not as a mere backcloth for theological study, it is well worth reading.

Prof. Frye's exposition of the Christian teaching embodied in *Paradise Lost* and *The Pilgrim's Progress,* in relation to the main stream of Protestant theology from Luther and Calvin to Barth and Niebuhr, is excellent so far as it goes, but by not going far enough it loses an opportunity. Milton and Bunyan were great theologians because they were great writers, but the relation between form and content in their work is not here explored. This type of book is valuable, but only when it is recognized that literature is more than a fine repository for fine ideas. Prof. Frye progresses beyond this stage, but the implication remains.

In *Martin Buber and Christianity* Roman Catholic Christianity is meant, which may explain the scant attention paid to *I and Thou.* But there is more to Buber than that, and Dr von Balthasar gives a discerning critique of Buber's attempt to restate traditional Judaism, especially in connexion with Zionism. His chapter on Israel's Mission is especially good and is a welcome corrective to the more fundamentalist biblical theology.

GLEN CAVALIERO.

EDINBURGH.

THE BIBLE IN OUR TIME. BIBLE WEEKS. By E. H. Robertson. S.C.M. Press. 1961. 4s.

This book outlines the details of the organization of Bible Weeks, in which the congregations of a whole town or area co-operate. In these projects the public exposition of biblical passages is followed by group discussion, in which the passage is linked to the particular needs of the locality, so that God may be heard to speak to that need. Though stressing the important fact that renewal of the Church is closely linked to a return to the Bible, it aggravates delicate questions about what is understood by the authority of the Bible and the way in which God speaks to men.

MARGARET KANE.

SHEFFIELD.

BOOK NOTES

Handbook for the New Rubrics by F. R. McManus (Geoffrey Chapman, 21s.) explains the extensive changes and simplifications in the Roman rite for Mass and the Divine Office that have been introduced by Pope John XXIII. They include changes in the calendar as well as in rubrical directions. Fr McManus, who is a professor of canon law at the Catholic University of America, relates his account of the changes to the liturgical movement. *D. H. Lawrence and Human Existence* by Martin Jarrett-Kerr, C.R. (S.C.M. Press, 8s. 6d.), is a new paper-back edition of a book that was first published in 1951. For the original edition, which was reviewed in THEOLOGY, June 1951, pp. 230 f., the author used the pseudonym "Father William Tiverton". He has now written a new introduction which includes comment on the Lady Chatterley case.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

BARRIE AND ROCKLIFF: Ulrich Simon, *The Ascent to Heaven* (21s.).
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: John Wilson, *Reason and Morals* (15s.).
DESCLÉE DE BROUWER (BELGIUM): Jean Galot, S.J., *Dans le Corps Mystique* (78 FB.); Ghislain Lafont, O.S.B., *Structures et Méthode dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (390 FB.).
FAITH PRESS: Nicholas Mosley, *The Life of Raymond Raynes* (25s.); Raymond Raynes, C.R., *The Faith* (5s.).
GOLLANCZ: Edward Carpenter, *Common Sense about Christian Ethics* (12s. 6d. and 6s.).
LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS: Conor K. Ward, *Priests and People* (25s.).
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY PRESS: Edward T. Gargan (Ed.), *The Intent of Toynbee's History* ($5.00).
MACMILLAN (NEW YORK): James M. Connolly, *The Voices of France* (38s. 6d.).
OLIVER AND BOYD: Ernst Lohmeyer, *Lord of the Temple* (15s.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Massey H. Shepherd, Jr, *The Reform of Liturgical Worship* (21s.).
S.C.M. PRESS: Alan Booth, *Christians and Power Politics* (6s.).
SIDGWICK AND JACKSON: Frank P. Chambers, *Perception, Understanding and Society* (25s.).
S.P.C.K.: Patrick Ferguson-Davie, *The Bishop in Church* (35s.).
WEIDENFELD AND NICOLSON: Nicolas Zernov, *Eastern Christendom* (42s.).

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
BILLING AND SONS LIMITED, GUILDFORD AND LONDON